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ARTEMY M. KALINOVSKY
A MOST BEAUTIFUL CITY  
FOR THE WORLD’S TALLEST DAM
Internationalism, social welfare, and urban utopia  
in Nurek
In March 1961, Semen Kalizhniuk, the head of construction for the Nurek Dam 
being built on the Vaksh river, met with the leading writers of Soviet Tajikistan, 
including the bard of Soviet anti‑colonialism Mirzo Turson‑Zade.1 The dam, 
which promised to expand irrigation and provide electricity for the southern 
part of the republic, was to be the tallest in the world. However, it was not 
just a dam that was being built; alongside it, Kalizhniuk promised, would arise 
a new city: 
We are planning a city that will be the prototype for future cities. All the 
conditions necessary for people will meet the requirements of the future of our 
communist society. Everything must be taken into account: height, capacity, the 
thickness of the walls, the circulation of air, temperature and so forth. It will be 
the kind of city, I think, that you can write about.2
Soviet architects and planners had been envisioning “cities of the future” since the 
revolution and building them from the start of industrialization during the first five 
year plan (1928‑1932). Such cities were supposed to provide for workers’ every 
The author would like to thank Marc Elie, Dina Fainberg, Julie McBrien, and the anonymous 
reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of the article.
1. Mirzo Turson‑Zade was a famous Tajik poet and public figure heavily involved in Soviet 
literary and anti‑colonial politics. For many years he led the Society for Solidarity with Asian 
and African Countries, an important player in Soviet relations with the Third World. 
2. “Meeting of Tajikistani writers with the comrade S.K. Kalizhniuk, head of construction of 
the Nurek Hydroelectric Dam,” 28 March 1961, CSAT (Central State Archives of Tajikistan), 
f. 1501, op. 1, d. 179, l. 15. 
Cahiers du Monde russe, 57/4, Octobre‑décembre 2016, p. 819‑846.
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need but also transform them into conscious, cultured citizens. In reality, urban 
construction rarely reached these ideals. As Paul Josephson notes, Soviet urban‑
ization 
was plagued by irrational planning and shortages, and everywhere its supposed 
benefits—museums, public transport, access to good medical care inexpensive 
housing—reached the residents least and last.3 
While Josephson is correct to note the gap between plans and realities in most of 
these cities, many did, in fact, develop much of their promise, usually long after the 
industry for which the town had been built was up and running. This article draws 
attention to the particular mix of utopian thinking, ideological commitment, and 
local politics that lay behind the construction of such cities by examining the case 
of Nurek City and its satellite villages. 
Nurek was to be the world’s tallest dam and one of its most powerful. Party 
leaders in Tajikistan pushed for the dam, hoping it would help expand irrigation and 
at the same time develop their republic’s industrial capacity and move them beyond 
agricultural production, especially cotton. The start of construction came at the 
height of Moscow’s re‑engagement with the Third World, when the Central Asian 
republics were increasingly called upon to play a leading role in demonstrating the 
superiority of Soviet modernity and its commitment to anti‑imperialism. Tajik poli‑
ticians who were proponents of the project argued that building such an expensive 
dam in a poor republic that had been on the margins of the Bukharan emirate and the 
Russian empire demonstrated Soviet technical prowess and its ability to transcend 
colonial legacies.4 By the l970s, the village of Nurek was on its way to becoming a 
model city, with a well‑paved thoroughfare, green space, modern amenities, as well 
as cultural and entertainment venues. The dam itself had an international work‑
force, with a growing share of Tajik workers, a testament to the promises of equally 
shared Soviet modernity. Engineering students from all over the Third World came 
to Nurek to gain experience. Domestic and foreign tourists visited Nurek as part of 
their Central Asian itinerary to see the dam under construction, take in the city’s 
orderly and modern layout and its well‑endowed library, and enjoy lunch by the 
river before heading back to Dushanbe, the capital of the Tajik SSR. 
3. Paul R.  Josephson, The Conquest of the Russian Arctic (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014), 240.
4. I discuss the origins of the Nurek dam in Artemy M. Kalinovsky, “Not some British Colony 
in Africa: Khrushchev, De‑stalinization, and Development in Central Asia,” Ab Imperio, 2 
(2013). To point out the connections between Soviet anti‑imperialism and the story of the dam 
is not to deny the other factors that determined whether or not a dam was built. Such deci‑
sions generally followed lobbying by coalitions that might include republican leaders, local 
specialists, and the relevant institutes and ministries in Moscow. See, for example Marc Elie, 
“Coping with the ‘Black Dragon’: Mudflow Hazards and the Controversy over the Medeo Dam 
in Kazakhstan, 1958–66,” Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Soviet History, 14, 2 (Spring 
2013). The most detailed work on Soviet dam construction is probably Klaus Gestwa, Die 
Stalinschen Grossbauten Des Kommunismus (Oldenbourg: De Gruyter, 2010) but it is only 
available in German. 
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The last decade has seen a series of studies on Soviet company towns. Some have 
focused on labor camps that became cities, such as Vorkuta or Ozersk, a center of 
Soviet plutonium production.5 Other scholars have focused on “new towns” such as 
Tol´iatti or Naberezhnii Chelni, created to house the workers for a given industry.6 
All of these studies have wrestled with how architecture, city planning, and other 
kinds of expertise were marshalled to mobilize labor resources while fulfilling 
some of the more utopian promises of the post‑Stalin Soviet Union. Lewis Siege‑
lbaum, in his study of To´liatti, a city built for the auto industry, emphasizes the 
importance of technical elites and the freedom they enjoyed to show the remarkable 
consistency between their plans and the city that took shape.7 Esther Maier, in her 
study of Naberezhnye Chelny, focuses on the “urban expression” of these cities and 
the “symbolic significance”  of its streets.8 These studies draw our attention to the 
way Soviet leaders after Stalin tried to fulfil promises of Soviet modernity through 
urban planning. They also point to the family resemblance not just of Soviet new 
towns of this period, but of broader trends in urban planning in industrial societies. 
This article contributes to this literature by focusing on how Nurek City came 
into being and the consequences of its construction for the surrounding villages and 
native population. The city and the surrounding villages were shaped and reshaped 
by hundreds of compromises and negotiations between planners, builders, party 
officials, workers, and local residents that took place within particular frameworks 
as officials tried to attract and keep labor, meet production targets, and live up to 
the ideals of Soviet labor culture and internationalism.9 To see the city’s history in 
this way is not to deny the disciplining nature of Soviet power, but rather to recon‑
sider where that power was located and how it operated. A widely accepted set of 
5. Alan Barenberg, Gulag Town, Company Town: Forced Labor and Its Legacy in Vorkuta 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2013); Kate Brown, Plutopia: Nuclear Families, Atomic 
Cities, and the Great Soviet and American Plutonium Disasters (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013). 
6. Kate Brown, “Gridded Lives: Why Kazakhstan and Montana Are Nearly the Same Place,” 
American Historical Review, (February 2001): 46‑47; Lewis Siegelbaum, “Modernity 
Unbound: The New Soviet City of the Sixties” in Anne E. Gorsuch and Diane Koenker, The 
Socialist Sixties: Crossing Borders in the Second World (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 2013), 66‑83; Esther Maier, “On The Streets of a Truck‑Building City: Naberezhnye 
Chelny in the Brezhnev Era” in Lewis Siegelbaum, ed., The Socialist Car: Automobility in the 
Eastern Block (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2011), 105‑122. 
7. Siegelbaum, “Modernity Unbound,” 67. 
8. Maier, ”On The Streets of a Truck‑Building City,” 105‑106. 
9. I draw on a mix of archival sources, memoirs, and oral histories in this paper. Key archival 
sources include the files for the Nurek party organization in the ACPT, Archive of the Commu‑
nist Party of Tajikistan, (f. 56) and the Central Committee (f. 3); files from the CSAT, Central 
State Archive of Tajikistan, relating to the construction of Nurek, including some of the 
Ispolkom materials in f. 1605; the collection of materials on Komsomol construction projects in 
the RGASPI, Russian State Archive of Social and Political History, f. M‑1, op. 8, and the files 
of Gosstroi (f. 339) in the RGAE, Russian State Archive of the Economy. Although for reasons 
of space I do not engage with them extensively in the current version of this paper, my thinking 
is also informed by extensive oral history interviews conducted in and around Nurek as well as 
former engineers, officials, and builders in Dushanbe and Moscow. The bi‑weekly newspaper 
Norak is also an important source. 
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ideas about “cultured” urban life determined what the city would become. Nurek 
was shaped by the way party activists, construction officials, workers, and local 
leaders responded to problems of disorder, disease, social welfare, and coexistence 
by falling back on these ideas; the solutions they found emerged from within the 
logic of post‑war Soviet modernity and welfare state, but that welfare state in its 
localized form was itself shaped by these struggles.10 In other words, even in the 
absence of a single utopian plan for the city or its satellites, large and small solu‑
tions that were part of a larger utopian project shaped the urban and rural of space. 
Nurek was one of dozens of new cities built in the 1960s to house workers 
for shock construction campaigns, as the Soviet Union sought to develop new 
territories and industries through mass mobilization rather than terror. Mikhail 
Rozhansky, who studied the experience of workers in Siberian new cities of the 
1960s, has written that 
shock construction projects and young cities were not just a part of the social 
atmosphere of the sixties; in the young cities one could identify the fundamental 
contradictions of Soviet idealism, and ideals came face to face with ideocracy.11 
In other words, these “new cities” lured young men and women with promises of 
fulfilling the Soviet dream, but greeted them with bureaucracy that reproduced 
slogans rather than working to fulfil those ideals. An examination of the Nurek 
case, however, suggests that this reading may require some correction. I argue that 
commitments to internationalism and equality, central elements of Soviet ideology, 
played an important role in Nurek’s history from its pre‑history up to the collapse 
of the USSR. Neither ideal would be truly fulfilled either in Nurek or in the Soviet 
Union as a whole, but Nurek and its environs would be shaped by the struggle of 
party officials, city officials, and local activists to meet these expectations. While 
Nurek has much in common with other Soviet new cities of the 1960s, its impor‑
tance as a showcase for the Soviets’ commitment to anti‑colonialism helped guide 
its development. This article’s main contribution, however, is to investigate the 
processes behind the making and reshaping of urban and rural spaces.12 Therefore, 
10. On the importance of examining the struggles that lead to the formation of welfare states 
rather than assuming an already formed “rationality” that guides these states, see Dennis 
Sweeney, “‘Modernity’ and the Making of Social Order in Twentieth‑Century Europe,” 
Contemporary European History, 23 (May 2014): 209‑224. 
11. Mikhail Rozhansky, “Sotsial´naia energiia: ustnaia istoriia udarnykh stroek [Social energy: 
An oral history of ‘shock contruction brigades’ in megaprojects],” Cahiers du Monde russe, 52, 
4 (2011): 619‑657.
12. A number of works have addressed the issue of internationalism on large construction 
sites in the USSR, usually noting the gap between promise of equality and reality of ethnic 
tension and discrimination. See, for example, Mathew Payne, Stalin’s Railroad: Turksib and 
the Building of Socialism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2001). Even more stark 
in this regard is the comparison offered in Christopher Ward, Brezhnev’s Folly: The Building 
of BAM and Late Soviet Socialism (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009).
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it will emphasize the ways in which the efforts to reach those goals shaped the 
welfare state, the city of Nurek, and the surrounding villages. 
These observations, in turn, lead me to make a further claim about the nature 
of ideology and ideological commitment in the Brezhnev era. Historians have 
long assumed a disjunction between the Khrushchev era, with its enthusiasm and 
renewed belief in communism, and the period of “stagnation” that followed—a 
distinction advanced first by Soviet intellectuals and reformers in the Perestroika 
era. More recently, historians have started to turn their attention to the period of 
“late Socialism,” filling out our knowledge of the era and in some cases questioning 
the extent to which the “stagnation” label is appropriate.13 Research on some of the 
ambitious projects of the era, like the Baikal‑Amur Magistral, tend to reaffirm the 
stagnation paradigm because they focus on the gap between plans and realities.14 
The Nurek project straddles the two eras and thus offers an opportunity to trace the 
fate of Khrushchev‑era ideological rebirth through the late 1960s and the 1970s. 
By focusing on the struggle to fulfil those ideals, we can see that Soviet ideolog‑
ical commitments remained appealing well into the late 1970s and helped mobilize 
people who had been left on the margins of Soviet society in earlier periods. 
Urban Utopias and Social Welfare
Urban utopias had played an important role since the revolution—how people 
lived was at the centre of the Bolshevik’s goals of industrialization and social 
transformation. The right kind of urban planning could help avoid the pitfalls 
of industrialization in the capitalist world, including overcrowding and urban 
inequality. In the 1920s, some of the more radical thinkers of the “disurbanist” 
movement hoped to close the gap between the (cultured but overpopulated and 
unhealthy) town and country by eliminating the former and spreading industry 
and labor throughout the countryside. Their opponents, the “urbanists,” dreamt of 
the elimination of the family unit, which would be replaced with communal living 
in large blocks of residences with day‑care, schools, and kindergartens.15 Both 
of these schools were side‑lined in the 1930s as Stalin favoured a more conserv‑
ative, monumental vision for cities inspired by the “City Beautiful” movement 
13. A number of special issues and edited volumes tackling the Brezhnev years have appeared 
in recent years, including two by Cahiers du Monde russe, 54, 1‑2 and 54, 3‑4 (2013). See also 
Neringa Klumbyte and Gulnaz Sharafutdinova Soviet Society in the Era of Late Socialism, 
1964‑1985 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2012); Edwin Bacon and Marc Sandle, Brezhnev 
Reconsidered (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003). For a close look at the origin of the “stag‑
nation” paradigm and its limits, see the introduction to Artemy M. Kalinovsky and Dina Fain‑
berg, eds., Reconsidering Stagnation (Langham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016). 
14.  Ward, Brezhnev’s Folly.
15. R.  Antony French, Plans, Pragmatism and People: The Legacy of Soviet Planning for 
Today’s Cities (London: UCL Press, 1995), 36‑37. 
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which had its roots in the U.S.16 However, these utopian ideas were nevertheless 
absorbed in later Soviet city planning, giving rise to, among other things, the 
ubiquitous but varied Soviet mikroraion, itself a variant of the “Garden City” 
envisioned by British and American planners at the turn of the century.17 They 
also influenced the planning of industrial cities during the 1930s, like Magnito‑
gorsk.18 The main model for Soviet company towns, however, was Nikolai Mily‑
utin’s “linear city,” which he outlined in his 1930 book Sotsgorod. Milyutin’s 
plans drew on Fordist and Taylorist ideas about industrial production, but also 
sought to insulate residents from industrial pollution, provide all necessary social 
services, and extend these to the surrounding countryside.19 Such cities were built 
not just to accommodate workers, but also to make them class‑conscious, enlight‑
ened (kulturnyi) and politically aware citizens. At the dawn of the Cold War the 
construction of these “socialist cities” was also encouraged in the new “People’s 
Democracies” such as Poland, where the Nova Huta city grew up around a new 
steelworks outside of Krakow.20 
The Khrushchev era saw several population trends that had important implica‑
tions for city planning and housing. First, the opening of the Gulag and the easing 
of restrictions on former prisoners meant that many of those who had been reset‑
tled in the country’s resource—rich but unhospitable areas—were leaving.21 At 
the same time, as farmers left the countryside for the cities, planners and demogra‑
phers worried that too many people and too much industry was being concentrated 
in the largest cities of the country, a trend that would become even more accen‑
tuated in the 1970s. The Soviet regime thus tried to promote the settlement and 
exploitation of distant areas by promising housing and amenities that were in short 
supply in the more overcrowded cities of the European USSR. The mobilization of 
young people to build new industries and new cities in distant parts of the country 
was part of the ideological atmosphere of the late 1950s and 1960s, and Khrush‑
chev’s attempt to shed the Stalinist legacy of forced labor and migration while 
inspiring a younger generation to lay the foundation of the future by conquering 
nature and mastering technology. 
16. Peter Hall, Cities of the Future: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the 
Twentieth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002 ed). 
17. French, Plans, Pragmatism, and People, 37‑38.
18. Stephen Kotkin, Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization (Berkley: University of 
California Press, 1995).
19. N.A. Miliutin, Sotsgorod: The Problem of Building Socialist Cities [Translated from the 
Russian by Arthur Sprage] (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1974), 20. 
20. See Katherine Lebow, Unfinished Utopia: Nowa Huta, Stalinism and Polish Society, 
1949‑56 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014). On Stalinist city planning see also Heather 
D. Dehaan, Stalinist City Planning: Professionals, Performance, and Power (Toronto: Univer‑
sity of Toronto Press, 2014). 
21. Some of them, indeed, would come to Nurek to start their lives anew, although that topic is 
beyond the scope of this paper.
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The 1950s also marked the transformation in the regime’s relationship with 
workers. A mass housing program, discussed under Stalin but only implemented 
under Khrushchev, gave millions of families their first opportunity at an individual 
urban apartment. As Mark B. Smith points out, while “[t]he dogma of paradise‑ 
using housing to create a way of life appropriate to communist ideals” existed 
in various forms from 1917 through the Stalin era, it was under Khrushchev that 
housing became
a mechanism for pushing society from socialism to communism. While paradise 
was always the ultimate goal, it was an explicit and immediate target only in the 
third stage of this scheme.22 
Indeed, at a conference on city planning in 1961, architects and officials discussed 
ideas from the 1920s, as well as British “new towns,” themselves descended from 
the “Garden City” idea, at length.23 Following the conference, a joint Central 
Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Council of Minis‑
ters Resolution called for “complex planned construction with capital investments 
[…] for housing, communal, cultural, and health services” on construction sites of 
particular importance located far from existing cities.24 As we will see, however, 
this resolution still left plenty of room for officials to decide just how planned and 
“complex” a city had to be. 
In Central Asia, the situation with housing and city planning was slightly 
different. Local politicians and planners saw the growth of cities as crucial to raising 
the standard of living in the republics. Like western modernization theorists and 
many post‑colonial elites, they believed in drawing people out of what they saw as 
an overcrowded countryside into industry. Local elites were often the most enthu‑
siastic proponents of expanding and modernizing existing cities like Tashkent.25 
22. Mark B.  Smith, Property of Communists: The Urban Housing Program from Stalin to 
Khrushchev (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2010), 8. On the housing program, 
see also: Stephen Harris, Communism on Tomorrow Street (Washington: Woodrow Wilson 
Centre Press, 2013).
23. French, Plans, Pragmatism, and People, 69. 
24. CC CPSU and Council of Ministers Resolution no 920, 7 October 1961, cited in RGASPI, 
f. M‑1, op. 8, d. 1069. 
25. On Tashkent, see Paul Stronski, Tashkent: Forging a Soviet City, 1930‑1966 (Pittsburgh: 
Pittsburgh University Press, 2010). Stronski sees Soviet planners as the main protagonists 
in the transformation of Tashkent. In fact, Nuritdin Mukhitdinnov, then 1st  secretary of the 
Uzbek Communist Party, writes in his memoirs that it was Uzbek party cadres in the 1950s 
who complained about the “old” Uzbek city falling behind the “new” Russian one in terms 
of modern buildings and amenities. Nuritdin Mukhitdinov, Gody provedennye v Kremle  : 
vospominaniia veterana voiny, truda i kommunisticheskoi partii, rabotavshego so Stalinym, 
Malenkovym, Khrushchevym, Brezhnevym, Andropovym [Years in the Kremlin : memoirs of 
a veteran of war, labor, and communist party, who worked with Stalin, Malenkov, Khrushchev, 
Brezhnev, and Andropov] (Tashkent: Izd. Narodnogo naslediia im. A. Kadyri, 1994‑), 245. On 
rebuilding Tashkent after the 1966 earthquake, see Nigel Raab, “The Tashkent Earthquake of 
1966: The Advantages and Disadvantages of a National Tragedy,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte 
Osteuropas, 62, 2 (2014): 273‑294. 
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The construction of hydroelectric dams and other industrial enterprises provided 
the opportunity to create “modern” planned cities for personnel and their fami‑
lies. Yaakov Fligelman, an official in the Ministry of Electrification who worked 
on various construction projects and would be involved in Nurek as well, boasted 
about the transformations brought by one of these cities in 1960: 
Many of the deputies remember well what the area of the beautiful, green city 
of builders of the Kairakkum GES [Hydro‑electric plant], once looked like. It 
was a barren, windy valley dried out by the sun. By the will of the party and the 
people, there emerged, over several years, a modern, comfortable city, supplied 
with the necessary communications and a full complex of facilities for culture 
and everyday life.26 
Such visions of transforming harsh, inhospitable nature into a modern, perfectly 
functioning city that fulfilled its residents’ every need would also come to shape 
Nurek, although the path from construction site to city would not be as straightfor‑
ward as Fligelman’s speech suggested. 
However, there were several problems with that vision. First, there was very 
little of the migration from the countryside to the cities seen in the European 
USSR. The large cities, like Dushanbe and Tashkent, were still settled primarily by 
migrants from outside the region. Since plans for industrialization had assumed a 
large local work‑force, the failure of Central Asians to urbanize and enter the indus‑
trial work force became an argument against further investment in industry among 
sceptics in Gosplan and other central Soviet bodies during the 1970s. Many offi‑
cials in Moscow were wary of sending labor to the region when it was increasingly 
seen as scarce in the European parts of the USSR and especially in Siberia. Second, 
there was a perception, at least in Tajikistan, that the cities were being developed 
primarily for Russian speakers. Housing was limited, and what was built went to 
the specialists and workers who were brought to the republic from outside. Tajiks 
and other Central Asians tended to stay away from the cities, and often disadvan‑
taged in the distribution for apartments when they did move there.27 
26. CSAT, f. 1605, op. 1, d. 14, Draft of Y. Fligelman’s speech to Tajik Supreme Soviet depu‑
ties, 6 July 1960.
27. The classic work on the problem of labor (non)migration in Central Asia remains Nancy 
Lubin, Labour and Nationality in Soviet Central Asia: An Uneasy Compromise (London: 
Macmillan, 1984). Of course there were both “pull” and “push” factors involved—potential 
workers might have preferred to stay close to families and social networks, but they also felt 
exclusion on coming to the city. Note that in the Perestroika era, the failure to make cities 
attractive for Tajiks was one of the complaints of Tohir Abdujabbor, a founder of Rastokhez 
who campaigned for Tajikistan’s sovereignty and later its independence. See, for example, 
Tohir Abdujabbor, “Muhiti zist va zabon [Environment and language],” Sadoi Sharq, no. 8 
(1989). Reprinted in Kamilzoda, Me´mori istikloli Tojikiston [Architect of Tajikistan’s Inde‑
pendence], 189. I discuss the problem of migration and industrialization in “Central Planning, 
Local Knowledge? Labor, Population and the ‘Tajik School of Economics’,” Kritika: Explora‑
tions in Russian and Soviet History 17, 3 (2016) : 586‑620.
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New, industry‑oriented cities like Nurek could prove that the benefits of Soviet 
urbanity were not just for Europeans. By the early 1970s, Tajik economists were 
pressing their own republican leaders and planners in Moscow to shift investments 
from “established” cities like Dushanbe to smaller towns in the republic. They 
believed that situating industry closer to the rural areas would make it easier to 
draw local workers into the industrial work‑force and raise the standard of living in 
the countryside. Cities like Nurek promised industrial employment for a population 
that remained in villages but could easily commute to work, while bringing the 
benefits of Soviet modernity to where these workers lived.28 
Ideas of urban planning were intimately tied to social welfare goals. As some 
historians have argued, twentieth‑century “welfare states,” have a family resem‑
blance. Generally, they involve a commitment by the state to provide for the health 
and education of its citizens, and to keep them out of poverty by providing housing 
and other services. The specific contours of different welfare states, however, 
developed through political struggles particular to that state’s history, and some‑
times varied even within states.29 The Soviet Union arguably aspired to be a 
welfare state from the very beginning, but it was only in the post‑Stalin era that 
the resources and organizational capacity to see it through were made available. 
This is particularly true in the case of Central Asia, where it is only from the 1950s 
that we see the real penetration of health clinics, schools, and other social services 
beyond the cities.30 
In the Soviet Union, it was often industrial giants that provided many of these 
social‑welfare services, either directly or indirectly.31 Not surprisingly, in Nurek it 
was the dam that became not just economic engine of the region but also the core 
around which the (local) welfare state was constructed. Directly or indirectly, the 
dam’s management became responsible for housing, road works, school construc‑
tion, a health network, and electrification. The commitment to internationalism and 
the commitment to the welfare‑state became mutually reinforcing; while the initial 
decisions to build health clinics and schools in the early‑mid 1960s, for example, 
were primarily about keeping the (still mostly European) work‑force healthy and 
its children educated, demands for equality from representatives of surrounding 
villages led officials to expand the provision of these social goods into the satellite 
villages that surrounded Nurek. 
28. I discuss the dynamics of the welfare state in the Soviet countryside in, “Tractors, Power 
Lines and the Welfare State: The Contradictions of Soviet Development in Post‑WWII Tajik‑
istan,” Asiatische Studien, 69, 3: 563‑592.
29. On the importance of examining the struggles that lead to the formation of welfare states 
rather than assuming an already formed “rationality” that guides these states, see Sweeney, 
“‘Modernity’ and the Making of Social Order in Twentieth‑ Century Europe.” 
30. See A. Kalinovsky, “Tractors, Power Lines, and the Welfare State: The Contradictions 
of Soviet Development in Post‑World War II Tajikistan,” Asiatische Studien, 69, 3 (2015): 
563‑592.
31. On industrial cities and social welfare in the late‑Soviet period, see Paul Collier, Post‑ 
Soviet Social: Neoliberalism, Social Modernity, Biopolitics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univer‑
sity Press, 2011), 65‑126.
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Construction site to city
Nurek lies about 70 kilometers south‑East of Tajikistan’s capital at a height of 
885 meters above the sea level. When construction began, there was a tobacco field 
and cemetery near the right bank of the Vaksh river. Besides the old town of Nurek, 
the area designated for the new city contained several villages: Desabur, Langar, 
and Sary‑bolo. All of these would eventually have to make way for the new Nurek, 
with the residents resettled in one of the surrounding villages or the city itself. 
Tut‑kaul, one of the larger villages in the area, would ultimately be submerged by 
the dam’s reservoir, its residents resettled onto the left‑bank into a village called 
“New Tut‑kaul.”
Constructing a model “city of the future” was neither an obvious nor an uncon‑
tested choice. Indeed, there was a broader debate among Soviet city planners 
regarding priorities in industrial and urban development. One school argued for 
laying the groundwork of the city first, to attract and keep good workers; another 
preferred to focus resources on developing industry, even if quality of life had to 
suffer.32 This divide was also visible in Nurek: despite Kalizhniuk’s promise to 
Tajik writers cited at the beginning of this article, it appears that not all managers 
and leaders actually agreed on the extent to which resources should be devoted to 
urban construction. According to Marat Hakel, an engineer who worked on Nurek 
in the 1960s, there was an ongoing debate between the directors of construction on 
the one hand and local party and executive authorities on the other regarding the 
priorities of city‑building. 
The [dam] builders, including head of construction S.K. Kalizhniuk, were in 
favor of quick (skorospeloe) housing […] local administrative and party organs 
were interested in building a real [capital] city with modern brick and panel 
housing and cultural‑communal facilities. The building of houses was slow, 
there was a catastrophic shortage of housing, and people were settled in tents, 
yurts, and wagons.33 
It is probable that Kalizhniuk agreed in principle with the construction of an 
“ideal” city, but subordinated this goal to that of securing resources for the dam. 
By contrast, the party secretary in the Tajik central committee responsible for 
industry insisted that “S.B. Ergashev, in charge of industry and construction within 
the central committee of the Communist Party of Tajikistan, told a plenum that “a 
town for 35 thousand people will have to be built, with parks, stadiums, pools, and 
movie theatres.”34 
32. William Taubman, Governing Soviet Cities: Bureaucratic Politics and Urban Development 
in the USSR (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973), 67‑68. 
33. Marat Ianovich Hakel, Unesennoe vetrom [Gone with the wind] published online in 2010 
http://samlib.ru/h/hakel_m_j/vek.shtml accessed 8 December 2016, ch. 19. 
34. Speech at the VII plenum of the CC CPT, April 1963, ACPT, f. 3, op. 177, d. 41, l. 134.
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Utopian visions for Nurek—as a city that met workers needs while helping raise 
them to a new cultural level—were thus in consideration from the earliest days of 
construction. In practice, construction of housing, parks, and other facilities had 
to compete for resources and labor with the construction of the dam itself, as well 
as with housing construction elsewhere in the republic. In addition, there were 
rumors that the project would be abandoned—it was far behind schedule, and many 
officials in Moscow were skeptical about the value of large dams in general and 
Nurek in particular.35 Pavel Gorbachev, the first secretary of the local party organi‑
zation, recalled that many officials doubted whether building a city was even neces‑
sary.36 Early plans therefore focused on building temporary housing as a stop‑gap 
measure—primarily “yurts” of the kind produced by a factory in Chardzhou and 
wooden eight‑apartment houses that had housed dam builders on the Volga.37 At 
the same time, local construction organizations and officials in Moscow agreed 
that ultimately Nurek would have to include schools, day care centers, cinemas, 
libraries, and so on.38 
Ultimately, however, managers found it difficult to manage a construction site 
where workers found living conditions inadequate. Relatively high salaries meant 
little when one could not get shelter or decent food, let alone entertainment or 
consumer goods. Many workers left within weeks or months of arrival. There were 
very few apartments even in 1964, but even getting a spot in a dormitory could be 
difficult, meaning that some workers spent months or years in tents.39 Even those 
lucky enough to get a spot in one of the dormitories, however, found barely accept‑
able conditions. An inspection found that 
in the larger dormitories the basic conditions are still not being met—there is no 
boiled or warm water, no closets for work clothes and clean clothes, no storage 
space and frequent delays and irregularities with changes of bedclothes, even 
though just this year the ZhKK [housing office] received more than 4 000 sheets 
and other bedding.40 
35. See, for example, “Ob uchastii komsomol´skoi molodezhi… [Regarding the participation 
of the komsomol youth…]” RGASPI, f. M‑1, op. 8, d. 1169.
36. Pavel Gorbachev, Plotina [The Dam] (M.: Politizdat, 1980), 137. 
37. “Protocol of a technical meeting regarding the Nurek GES,” RGAE, f. 339, op. 6 d. 3368, 
l. 221. 
38. By early 1961, planners had agreed on a town that would peak at 20,000 residents during 
construction and decline to roughly 10,000 afterwards, with a standard of 9 square meters per 
resident in the initial period ultimately rising to 12 square meters. Most of the houses would 
be 4 floor apartment blocks, but there would also be some 2 floor apartment buildings with 
personal garden plots. Conclusions of a sub‑committee of the Gosekonomsovet regarding the 
Nurek GES, 23 January 1961, f. 339, op. 6, d. 3370.
39. Letter to Norak newspaper, 28 December 1964, ACPT, f. 5, op. 5 d. 42, p. 83‑84. 
40. “Regarding residential and cultural construction in the city of Nurek,” CSAT, f. 1609, op. 1, 
d. 79, l. 12.
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A Komsomol inspection similarly found that dormitories lacked “chairs, hangers, 
closets, dressers; the sinks do not work, and two weeks or more pass before bedding 
is changed.”41 Another report noted that in the men’s dormitories, “dirt and uncul‑
turedness rule.”42 Workers were apparently stealing wood from the construction 
site to burn for warmth.43 
As with many construction sites where thousands of young workers gathered, 
drinking and hooliganism were a big part of daily life in Nurek in the early 1960s. 
Crucially, however, officials understood the problem to be lack of cultural activi‑
ties and facilities where workers could spend their free time. A Komsomol article 
noted that 
The lack of basic cultural facilities is leading people to drunkenness and crime. 
The amount of alcohol per person consumed in Nurek has doubled between 
1962 and 1963, and is twice the volume consumed in Dushanbe.44 
Over 1 000 people, roughly every fifth resident of Nurek, were arrested over the 
course of the year for “disturbing the public order.” Drunkenness and hooliganism 
made it difficult to maintain an orderly construction site and contributed to absen‑
teeism. Although officials rarely stated this in their reports, it also caused strains 
between the newly arrived workers and the local residents, thus undermining the 
“internationalism” of the whole project. The republic newspaper, Kommunist 
Tadzhikistana, chided local officials for failing to provide decent living conditions 
and especially opportunities for “cultured relaxation.”45 The solution, party and 
Komsomol officials believed, was to find a way to divert the energy of young 
people to more “cultured” activities, like movie screenings, dances, concerts, and 
organized sports. They pressed for the construction of dance floors, libraries, and 
a stadium.46 Officials were seeking solutions to practical problems, but evoking 
utopian reasoning to find them. Only when a city contained the elements that were 
commonly believed to provide for the needs of residents and help transform them 
into cultured citizens would social problems disappear.
41. “Regarding the role of Komsomol organizations…,” RGASPI, f.  M‑1, op.  8, d.  1169, 
l. 12‑23. 
42. “Regarding the participation of Komsomol members and youth…,” 16  April 1964, 
RGASPI, f. M‑1, op. 9, d. 1169, l. 1‑11 
43. Some 2  000 cubic meters of wood were apparently stolen in one year. “V storone ot 
glavnogo [On the margins of what is important],” Norak, 24 August 1962.
44. “Regarding the role of Komsomol organizations…,” RGASPI, f.  M‑1, op.  8, d.  1169, 
l. 12‑23.
45. “Regarding the article ‘Why it is boring in Nurek’,” 12 February 1963, ACPT, f. 56, op. 5, 
d. 6, l. 9.
46. “Regarding the role of Komsomol organizations…,” RGASPI, f.  M‑1, op.  8, d.  1169, 
l. 12‑23; “Regarding the article ‘A s bytom v Tut Kaule plokho’ [In Tut Kaul everyday life is 
not good],” 12 February 1963, ACPT, f. 56, op. 5, d. 6, l. 11. 
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There were other practical reasons for construction managers to start taking 
urban construction more seriously. Poor living conditions, disease, and boredom, 
all led to a high circulation of cadres. In the first six months of 1961, the first year of 
construction, 30% (1836) of the workers hired during that same period quit.47 Party 
activists criticized managers for failing to pay attention to residential construction. 
“Hundreds of experienced specialists are leaving the construction site,” a commu‑
nist named Gamianova complained at a party meeting, addressing Kaliuzhniuk, 
“they are leaving because they are not given the minimal conditions for work.”48 
As late as 1967 officials were complaining about severe labor shortages, and espe‑
cially the turnover of qualified labor.49 That year, out of a total work force of 9 514 
people engaged in various enterprises related to Nurek, 4  387 had quit or been 
fired and 4 526 were newly hired.50 Nurek was neither a closed city nor a Stalinist 
work camp, and workers were free to come and go. Party activists like Gamianova 
connected labor turnover with problems of housing, provisions, and quality of life. 
Enthusiasm and the promise of high wages were enough to bring workers to the 
site, but not to keep them there. 
As construction officials like Kalizhniuk, who had the most say in the distri‑
bution of funds and materials between urban construction and the main dam site, 
came around to the point of view of party activists who believed the city and the 
dam had to be built together, they too began to push for constructing something 
like the “city of the future” envisioned earlier, even if it meant taking resources 
away from the main construction site. Whether or not they bought in to the broader 
ideological goals behind the idea of creating a model city, these officials saw that 
they would need to provide a city with enough amenities, shelter, and entertain‑
ment to keep workers there for the duration of construction. By 1964, construc‑
tion engineers were begging Moscow and Dushanbe to invest millions more in 
housing, schools, and medical facilities.51 A Pravda article mocked those who had 
favored temporary housing: 
There was an idea to build the Nurek GES quickly. And if so, then what’s the 
point of building housing? The builders can live in yurts. Well, life has laughed 
at those who supported this strange idea. 
47. CSAT, f. 1470, op. 2, d. 24, l. 12. 
48. “V storone ot glavnogo,” Norak, 24 August 1962.
49. “At the moment we are short 300 laborers for tunnelling work, and 400 in various construc‑
tion organizations and auto depots […] some 1 400  laborers and engineering‑technical 
workers […] have quit,” the head of NurekGesStroi complained in 1967, “[and] as a rule it is 
the qualified labour that quits.” “Regarding the extremely unsatisfactory provision of Nurek 
builders…,” 7 July 1967, ACPT, f. 3, op. 264, d. 201, 81‑82. 
50.  Protocol of the 5th Nurek City Party Conference, 27 January 1968, ACPT, f. 45, op. 7, d. 28, 
l. 32.
51. Sevenard and Chesnokov to Rasulov, Kakharov, and Neporozhnii, 25 January 1964, ACPT, 
f. 3, op. 203, d. 164, l. 6‑8.
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But the article also mocked those who wanted to go in the opposite direction. Refer‑
ring to Manilov, a daydreaming character from Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls who 
thought up projects that could never be fulfilled, the paper wrote: “The planners 
hit the other extreme. They showed incredible manilovschinu, drawing a picture of 
Nurek, the ‘city of the future’ on their drafting paper.”52 
Even when managers committed to building housing or other facilities, shortages 
of labor, materials, and problems with transport made it hard to bring plans to frui‑
tion.53 The republic’s construction industry could barely keep up with the regular 
demands of an expanding urban population, let alone the construction of a new city. 
A new factory to produce housing materials was being built in Ordzhonikidzeabad, 
but it would be a while before it could operate at capacity. In subsequent years, the 
rush to catch up and build housing led to shoddy construction throughout the city, 
necessitating fundamental repairs.54 
Nevertheless, construction officials had come to think of the workers as an urban 
population, and of the workers’ health, comfort, and family life as falling within 
their sphere of responsibility. They petitioned republic and Soviet authorities to 
allocate additional funds for residential construction, medical and service facilities, 
and entertainment venues.55 Gradually, conditions began to improve. The tent cities 
gave way to dormitories, and then the first apartment blocks. Hakel recalled that 
imperceptibly, Nurek started to acquire traits appropriate for a city. On the main 
street (as always, named after Lenin), multi‑story buildings arose, on one of 
which a color mosaic panel was raised, showing a worker walking with the dam 
in the background and the words of V. Maiakovsky “I know‑there will be a 
city!” Nurek also started getting the kind of cultural and educational facilities 
planners envisioned, including a new ten year school and a summer movie 
theatre. [Although] in many places people were walking ankle deep in dust, the 
kishlak was slowly disappearing.56 
Sedykh, in a 1967 Pravda article called the “Diamond of the Vaksh,” boasted 
“Nurek already exists. In the place of the mud‑brick kishlak a modern city with a 
population of almost 20 thousand people has arisen.”57 
52. Pravda, 7 July 1963.
53. Seventy‑one apartments were supposed to be ready by the end of 1961; in fact, none of 
them had yet passed inspection and been accepted for residents. Construction on a planned 
apartment building for the executive committee of the city Soviet had not even broken ground. 
“Regarding housing and cultural‑everday use construct in the city of Nurek.” CSAT, f. 1605, 
op. 1, d. 79, l. 1‑15. 
54. “Narodnaia kopeika schet liubit [The people’s kopek likes to be counted],” Norak, 
22 January 1963; “Ravnodushuiu, net! [No to indifference!],” Norak, 18 June 1963. 
55. Konstanin Sevenard, head of Nurek Tadzhik GidroStroi, and I. Chesnokov, Director of the 
GES, to Rasulov Kaharov, and Neporozhnii, 25 October 1964. 
56. Hakel, Unesennoe vetrom, ch. 19 
57. E. Sedykh, “Zhemchuzhena Vaksha [Jewel of the Vaksh],” Pravda, 12 March 1967. From 
a census conducted that year, it appears that Sedykh was exaggerating about the size of the 
population. See footnote 49. 
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Indeed, it was the failure of early estimates about the project’s duration that 
made the construction of a planned permanent city possible. Gorbachev, who 
seems to have been one of the early proponents of building a permanent city, wrote: 
“No doubt, if construction only lasts 3‑5 years, and the district has no chance of 
further economic development, one can and should focus on temporary housing.” 
However, he went on to say, if the project lasts longer, for 10‑15 years, then one has 
to think not just about the construction site but about urban formations. People may 
arrive as single demobilized soldiers or recent graduates of technical institutes, but 
if they stay long enough they will form families. In an apparent rebuke to those who 
had argued for holding off on urban construction, Gorbachev asked: 
Can you deny builders basic conveniences? Can you deny the children of 
builders their swing‑sets, slides, and swimming pools? In place of the “theory 
of the temporary” there comes sober and serious calculations: labor turnover 
is more expensive than swing sets, a fountain, and even a modern House of 
Culture!58 
By 1967, the situation had changed in a number of ways that reflected the changing 
economic role of Nurek and accelerated its transformation into a permanent city. 
First, while labor turnover was still a problem, more workers were staying. In fact, 
they were forming families. A city of 11 967 had 4 356 children – more than a third 
of the population. Moreover, earlier delays in construction meant that the city had 
not even reached its peak population. To get the first turbine functioning by 1970, 
as called for at the XXIII party congress, would require a doubling of the work 
force. Whereas in the early part of the decade it may have been unclear what kind 
of settlement would be built for the workers, by 1967 the debate over what kind 
of city to build had been settled. The new workers would not have to live in tents; 
instead, officials would do what they could to have dormitories and apartments 
ready for them.59 
Finally, the place of Nurek in the development of Southern Tajikistan had 
changed over the course of the 1960s. Although the electricity from the Nurek dam 
had always been intended for several industrial giants to be built in South‑West 
Tajikistan, it was only gradually over the course of the 1960s that the idea of a 
“Southern Tajikistan Territorial Industrial Complex” took hold among local plan‑
ners and won approval from Moscow.60 Planners initally presumed that Nurek 
would be either a settlement for construction workers or at most a “maintenance 
58. Gorbachev, Plotina, 137. 
59. Results of a survey of the population of Nurek, 3 January 1967, RGAE, f. 339, op. 6 d. 3373, 
l. 50‑53. 
60. Indeed, planners advocated Territorial Production Complexes across the USSR in the 
1960s as a solution to problems of inefficiency in transport, energy distribution, and access to 
resources and labor. See Kalinovsky, “Central Planning, Local Knowledge? Labor, Population, 
and the Tajik School of Economics,” Kritika: Exploration in Russian and Eurasian History, 17, 
3 (2016): 585‑620.
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town” for the staff who would stay to operate the dam after construction was 
complete. While the precise details of the complex were to be debated and contested 
until the collapse of the USSR, there seems to have been agreement that Nurek 
should itself become a minor industrial city within a broader network of small 
cities built around industries. 
Internationalism and Urban Planning
If utopian ideas about urban planning and urban living helped shape Nurek city 
over the course of the 1960s, internationalism, understood as the obligation of 
working people to help each other regardless of their national origin, helped push 
those changes beyond Nurek proper and into the surrounding villages. Arguably, 
internationalism served both to drive and to justify Moscow’s foreign policy, 
from its economic aid in the Third World to its military intervention in Afghan‑
istan (1979‑1989). The Soviet commitment to internationalism helped it make 
contacts with the decolonizing world in the 1950s and 1960s, propelling Central 
Asia to a central place in Soviet foreign policy.61 The rise of China as an addi‑
tional contender for influence in the Third World made the demonstration of Soviet 
domestic equality all the more important, as Beijing alleged that the Soviet Union 
was actually just another racist European empire.62 Anti‑colonialism and inter‑
nationalism as understood by the Soviets were sometimes at odds—for example, 
when the former was used to mobilize post‑colonial states against European coun‑
tries, forcing Moscow to choose between supporting the European working class 
or the post‑colonial states.63 
The ideals of internationalism were also supposed to govern relations between 
the different national groups within the Soviet Union. The ideology was particu‑
larly important for projects like Nurek, where labor and resources from across the 
union had to be mobilized for an initiative that was supposed to serve as a demon‑
stration of Soviet ideals for domestic and foreign audiences. Internationalism 
abroad and internationalism at home were deployed in different ways but were 
often intertwined. In both cases, the rhetoric of “internationalism” was addressed 
to two audiences: one domestic (the Soviet citizens sending their sons to fight in 
distant wars, or going there themselves) and one on the receiving end of interna‑
tionalist aid. In the late 1950s, when officials in Moscow expressed doubts about 
61. The connection between Soviet policies in Central Asia and its relations with the Third 
World has been made in a number of recent works, including Masha Kirasirova, “Sons of 
Muslims in Moscow: Soviet Central Asian Mediators to the Foreign East, 1955‑1962,” Ab 
Imperio, 4 (2011): 106‑132. See also Ted Hopf, Reconstructing the Cold War: The Early Years 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 
62. Jeremy Friedman, Shadow Cold War: The Sino‑Soviet Competition for the Third World 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015), 182‑183. 
63. See the excellent discussion of these ideals and their contradictions in Friedman, Shadow 
Cold War, 25‑59. 
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the dam, citing costs and the difficulty of construction in such a small location, 
Tajik officials eager to get it built cleverly portrayed the dam as a project that could 
demonstrate the reality of good relations between Soviet peoples and an example to 
nearby states like Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India.64 Once the construction process 
got underway, internationalism was heralded and promoted in the local press and 
in all publications about Nurek. Internationalism was also a tool to overcome the 
opposition of bureaucrats reluctant to allocate resources to the project, or to mobi‑
lize workers for the project. 
Internationalism served a disciplining function that bound the actions of both 
employees and managers, including party officials. Thus, workers were enjoined 
to think about “internationalism” in the work place, which meant, first and fore‑
most, identifying with workers of different nationalities on the basis of class 
and membership in the Soviet family. “International” brigades were particularly 
celebrated65 and managers had to prove their commitment to internationalism by 
hiring and promoting workers from the local population, setting up “international” 
brigades like the one led by the often‑celebrated Muhabbat Sharipov, and in 
general making sure that everyone benefited equally from the dam project. Those 
who failed to do so were chided for “failing to understand the political signifi‑
cance” of their actions.66 Not only did they have to demonstrate their commit‑
ment to internationalist equality to those higher‑up, they could also come under 
attack from subordinates or residents for favoring “Russians” in employment or 
in choosing which schools, roads, and settlements would receive investments. The 
local party organization served as kind of disciplining agent, reminding managers 
to look beyond their purely technical goals and remember the broader social goals 
they were supposed to serve. 
At the same time, the idea that the city itself should become a showpiece also 
took hold. Tajikistani proponents of Nurek had connected the building of the dam 
to the USSR’s broader commitment to internationalism and anti‑colonialism, but in 
the first decade of construction, when the dam’s fate remained uncertain, this idea 
seemed to have fallen by the way‑side. In any case, a dusty field of tents and tempo‑
rary housing peopled by drunken and diseased workers building a dam no one sure 
would be completed was hardly good propaganda material. By 1968‑69, however, 
officials again started talking about the project’s importance for demonstrating 
internationalism, both among the peoples of the Soviet Union and working people 
the world over. When the dam was to have been built quickly, officials mostly 
planned to use skilled labor brought in from outside the republic. Yet the problem 
of labor turnover and the project’s duration forced them to change their strategy. 
64. Kalinovsky, “Not some British Colony in Africa.” 
65. By the early 1970s, officials claimed that out of 220 brigades, almost each one had repre‑
sentatives of at least five nationalities. A brigade led by Muhabbat Sharipov, a hero worker 
from Nurek, was among those most often lauded in the local press as “truly international” 
because it included “Tajiks, Russians, Tatars, and Ukrainians.” Norak, 16 November 1972, 2.
66.  Hakel, Unesennoe vetrom, ch. 19.
836 ARTEMY M. KALINOVSKY
By the mid‑1960s, they were working out strategies to bring the local population 
into the workforce. Nurek became a site where one could find the “results of coop‑
eration between workers, engineers, and technicians of different nationalities.” In 
addition, from 1968 groups of Middle Eastern, Asian, Latin American, and African 
students attending the Patrice Lumumba University began coming to Nurek for the 
practical component of their studies.67 
 It was also around this time that Nurek started becoming a destination for 
domestic and foreign tourists, part of an itinerary that might include the ancient 
cities of Bukhara and Samarkand in neighboring Uzbekistan, a trip by train to 
Dushanbe, and then by bus to visit the site of the dam. Pamphlets in Russian, 
English, French, and German touted a city of “bright, comfortable apartment 
houses” that had replaced an “old kishlak [village] with its rickety huts” where
Tajiks and Russians, Uzbeks and Georgians, Evenks and Latvians, as well as 
representatives of many other nationalities and peoples of the Soviet Union live 
and work […] as a large and well‑knitted family. 
The Soviet tourist agency Intourist invited visitors to take in the city after dark and 
“admire a sea of lights which opens to view from the mountain ridge surrounding 
the city.”68 Bringing third‑world students and tourists from across the world to 
observe and experience the reality of Soviet domestic internationalism helped 
demonstrate the Soviet commitment to anti‑colonialism and its suitability as a 
model development for Third World nations. 
As Nurek city became a showcase for Soviet internationalism and modernity, 
officials were under even more pressure to make it habitable and beautiful. In 
May 1968, Aleksei Kosygin, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers, visited 
the site and the city, instructing local officials to start taking the city’s appear‑
ance seriously and encouraging them to make it as impressive as possible.69 A 
new plan for improving the town’s appearance, including the facades along the 
main street, the construction of a main plaza with a fountain, and the greening of 
the city, was drawn up in 1968.70 “The face of the city of dam builders needs to 
become exemplary…” B. Shukurov, chairman of the city executive committee, 
said at a party meeting, 
67. “Snova v Nureke [Once again in Nurek],” Norak, 13 June 1969.
68. “Nurek,” Intourist Pamphlet (M.: Vneshtorgizdat, n.d.).
69. Gorbachev, Plotina; “Iunomu gorodu dostoinii oblik [A dignified look for the young city],” 
Norak, 17 May 1968. “Plany i fakty [Plans and facts],” Norak, 19 September 1968. Vladislav 
Ianelis, “Goriachii polius Nureka [The hot pole of Nurek],” Smena, 10 (May 1981): 2.
70. ”Iunomu gorodu energetikov – krasotu,” [For the young city of energy builders – beauty] 
Norak, 7  October  1969. According to the article, only half of the trees planted that spring 
survived until the autumn. 
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a great task has been set before us – next to the unique dam, rightly called the 
diamond of the Vaksh, to build the city of communism’s tomorrow, a source of 
pride for all the residents of Nurek and their guests.71
The identification of Nurek with internationalism was further strengthened in the 
1970s, when the magazine Druzhba narodov [friendship of the people] made the 
city a kind of pet project. The magazine’s purpose was to promote internation‑
alism through literature, and it published writers from across the USSR and hosted 
debates about socialist art. The magazine organized several roundtables on Nurek 
and published accounts by its managers and workers. Its biggest contribution, 
perhaps, was organizing a book drive for Nurek’s library. Famous authors from 
across the world were invited to send autographed copies of their works to the 
magazine, which would then pass them on to the library.72 
City and Village
If Nurek was going to become a demonstration of Soviet modernity and internation‑
alism for foreign visitors, officials would first have to prove that internationalism 
within the Soviet Union was a reality. Nurek, as we saw, had made the transition 
from construction site to city over the course of a decade, but it was inhabited 
mostly by outsiders. By the late 1960s there was a clear dividing line between the 
city and its satellite villages, as urban officials strove to eliminate traces of village 
life within the city’s boundaries. As urban conditions improved, however, local 
workers and party members began to voice discontent regarding the situation in 
their own villages, forcing party organizations and construction agencies to expand 
the borders of their work. 
The struggle over seemingly mundane issues like roads or sanitation was 
often framed in terms of nationality politics; equally important, however, was the 
push in the late 1960s to raise standards of living and extend the welfare state 
to the Soviet countryside. Marx had advocated bridging the gap in living stand‑
ards and culture between the countryside and the city, and planners like Miliutin 
had tried to address this goal in their work. It was only in the Brezhnev years, 
however, that sufficient resources were allocated to make this goal a reality on 
a wide scale. New agencies were created at the all‑union and republic levels to 
bring the benefits of Soviet modernity to rural residents.73 This development, in 
turn, spurred a renewed interest in designing “model kishlaks” that would facili‑
tate the cultural transformation of Central Asians. Moritz Florin has shown how 
planners and architects in Kyrgyzstan envisioned model villages where houses did 
71. B. Shukurov, “The role of local soviets in the development of Nurek,” Norak, 13 June 1969. 
72. See, for example, “Nurekskaia biblioteka popolniaetsia [The Nurek library fills up],” 
Druzhba Narodov, no. 6 (1974): 285.
73. See Kalinovsky “Tractors, Power Lines.” 
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not have the customary walls separating the yard from the street; removing the 
walls was supposed to make the village more social and integrate families.74 Tajik 
archives similarly contain dozens of plans for “ideal villages” of various kinds, 
with the usual combination of modernized housing, cultural and medical facilities, 
and schools.75 
When we look at Nurek’s satellite villages, however, we do not see new villages 
arising on the basis of these plans; rather, elements of “modern” living entered 
villages through the demands of locals or insistence of party activists based in 
Nurek. As with the demands and expectations of workers from outside the republic, 
the demands of villagers were channelled through formal institutions like the 
kishlak soviets (village councils), election meetings, and party organizations, as 
well as through informal ties between prominent workers from a village and mana‑
gerial elites. The extension of infrastructure and services, in turn, led the state (from 
a kind of operational base in Nurek city) to increase its interventions in the lives 
of people. The city’s party organization and its construction organizations would 
become responsible for modernizing the villages.76 
The construction of the Nurek dam made the city, which had previously been 
of little administrative or economic importance, the nucleus of party activity 
and the physical center of all construction in the vicinity. According to Pavel 
Gorbachev, Nurek’s first party secretary, early on in the dam’s construction, the 
villages that made up the city’s periphery were already delimited as being part 
of the city’s authority, and were to receive the same attention as the city itself. 
In 1962, he claims, he arranged for Petr Stepanovich Neporozhniy, the USSR 
Minister of Energy and Electrification, to visit Kibil at the invitation of one of the 
elders in the kishlak. During his tour of the village, Gorbachev remembers, the 
elder asked the minister: 
You’ve come to us from the heart of our Motherland—Moscow—a beautiful 
city with tall buildings. Thank you for finding the time to visit us. People say that 
Nurek will also become a beautiful city, of a kind not yet seen in the republic. 
In its new houses there will be electricity, the housewife will no longer have to 
cook soup on an open fire, because there will be gas stoves, and water will reach 
each kitchen. This is very good. But what does the great minister think about 
those kishlaks where there is no electricity, where people have to walk half a 
74. Moritz Florin, “Faites tomber les murs! La politique civilisatrice de l’ère Brežnev dans les 
villages kirghiz,” Cahiers du Monde russe, 54, 1‑2 (2013): 187‑211.
75. See, for example, the various projects for “the layout, construction, and landscaping” of 
rural settlements submitted to the State Committee for Construction in CSAT, f. 1622, op. 1, 
d. 390. 
76. By 1967, 23% of the city’s residents were “service personnel,” which was the result of 
the fact that “the city of Nurek, surrounded by more than 10 kishlaks, is currently serving as a 
district center, and its organizations are serving not only the population of Nurek but also the 
surrounding kishlaks.” Zubov, Chairman of Gosstroi of the Tajik SSR, to Novikov, RGAE, 
f. 399, op. 6, d. 3373, l. 57, 3 January 1967. 
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kilometre to draw water on the banks of the Vaksh? Nor is there a good school or 
medical clinic, or asphalt roads or sidewalks?77
According to Gorbachev, Neporozhnii turned to him and said: 
Take a compass, and make a circle around Nurek with a radius of fifty kilometres, 
and give electricity to all the kishlaks [that fall within it].78 
The story may or may not be true, but it does point to the way the project trans‑
formed local geographies, and the role of the city as a civilizing agent and carrier 
of the Soviet welfare state. At first, the transformation of Nurek from a construction 
site to a city accelerated the separation of European workers and locals. Concerns 
about disease pushed officials to speed up the construction of housing, improve 
infrastructure, and build health facilities. They also sharpened the divide between 
the city of Nurek and the surrounding countryside. At this point the older residents 
of Nurek were still living in their family homes, the settlements that would be 
absorbed into the city interspersed with tents, the quickly assembled wooden apart‑
ment blocks, and the more solid brick buildings in early stages of construction. 
Like most villagers they kept animals that helped supplement the family diet. But 
sanitation officials believed that these animals caused disease and made it clear that 
there was no room for farm animals in a city: 
The residents of the city of Nurek, and of Saary‑bolo and Desabur keep animals 
(chickens, cows, pigs, geese, ducks and many dogs). Keeping animals in the 
city and the unsatisfactory sanitation leads to a large number of flies, which are 
carriers of disease.79 
In the following years, these people would be resettled in surrounding villages, 
along with the barnyard animals. The only “farming” that was allowed within the 
city was the cultivation of small garden plots attached to some of the two‑floor 
apartment blocks. 
The emerging city was primarily settled by European families, while local fami‑
lies continued to live in the villages. This was largely a matter of preference; the 
villages provided more space and families could expand their dwellings as people 
were born or married into family.80 In the early part of the decade laborers from 
outside Nurek lived in squalid conditions compared to the local peasantry. A decade 
77. Gorbachev, Plotina, 67‑68.
78. Ibid., 68. 
79. Resolution of the Executive Committee of the City Council of Nurek, 23 September 1963, 
CSAT, f. 1605, op. 1, d. 407, l. 19.
80. Almost none of the people I interviewed spoke of any desire to move to the city when it 
was being constructed, preferring the spaciousness of the village. Nor have I seen anything in 
the archival sources that suggests demand for housing from locals as opposed to the labourers 
coming from elsewhere.
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later that was no longer the case. The city not only had living space, it was quickly 
outpacing the surrounding villages in the growth of services. Now the city had both 
light and running water, new schools and hospitals. The same could not be said for 
the villages. Officials noted that 
in the majority of the kishlaks, located within the borders of the city, there is 
no running water, electric lighting, or radio. There are no pharmacies, medical 
centres (medpunkt) or libraries. There is no regular bus service between the 
kishlaks.81 
Resentment began to set in when it became clear that resources were mostly 
directed towards the city, while the villages were left behind in terms of access to 
electricity, running water, quality of construction materials for houses, roads, and 
schools.
On January 13, 1968, E.K. Sedykh, Nurek’s representative in the Tajik SSR 
Supreme Soviet, was meeting with voters from Kibil, New Tutkaul, and Karatay. 
Two communists who were present, Ahmedov, a labourer working on the dam and 
Rahmonov, head teacher at the Kibil school, complained about the state of their 
village. According to a report on the meeting, 
they rudely blamed the executive committee (ispolkom) of the City Soviet of 
Worker’s Deputies and the deputy of the Supreme Soviet comrade E.K. Sedykh, 
who supposedly did not care about the conditions and services (blagoustroistva) 
in Kibil, which still does not have water, there is no bus stop, and the school is 
in a bad building. 
Ahmedov’s real transgression was making it about nationality—apparently he 
complained that if “Russians” lived in his village, surely it would already have all 
the things that had been promised before. It seems that a high degree of dissatisfac‑
tion led to the emotionally charged meeting: 
despite the fact that in the course of this meeting the chair of the city executive 
committee sharply corrected these orators, nevertheless the communist 
comrades Ahmedov and Rahmonov continued to be rude and untactful.
Their behaviour was censured.82 By connecting the problem of running water, 
transportation, and schooling to nationality, they showed they were buying into the 
promises of internationalism, equality, and social welfare, and willing to call out 
senior officials when these promises were not met.
81. “Regarding the fundamental improvement of services for culture and everyday life of the 
workers of the Nurek GES,” 20 October 1966, ACPT, f. 56, op. 7, d. 16, l. 89. 
82. “Regarding the meeting of comrade Sedykh with workers from Kibil, Novyi Tutkaul, and 
Karatay,” Nurek Party Committee Buro Meeting, 25 January 1967, ACPT, f. 56, op. 7, d. 30. 
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And yet Ahmedov and Rahmonov’s protest did get the attention of city author‑
ities. It was one of the first issues Gorbachev brought up at his address to the 
party conference at the end of the month, placing the extension of services to the 
surrounding Kishlaks on the top of the agenda for the party organization.83 He also 
personally criticized officials who had failed to organize bussing for students from 
Karatash and the new school building for Tutkaul.84 Increasingly, as the 1960s 
became the 1970s, the physical condition of the satellite villages as well as general 
social welfare there came under the purview of city organizations. Ahmedov and 
Rahmonov’s complaint—and their claim that internationalist norms were being 
violated—had evidently been heard. 
Although thousands of families would be resettled to work the cotton fields 
irrigated by Nurek, the dam itself only required the resettlement of one village, 
Tutkaul, which became submerged as the reservoir rose, as well as some of the 
households that occupied what ultimately became Nurek. Tutkaul was resettled 
nearby; just as Nurek was becoming a model city, New Tutkaul was supposed to 
serve as a model village, with a rational layout and modern conveniences. A publi‑
cation from the 1970s boasted, that: 
The old mud village (kishlak) of Tutkaul was submerged by the man‑made 
sea. All of its residents were transferred to the left bank of the Vaksh. The new 
everyday life is evident everywhere. In the so‑called “kishlak” you have all the 
urban conveniences: electricity, radio, television, and refrigerators…85 
In fact, residents would have to wait for years before they got running water and 
electricity, though it does appear to have become one of the more comfortable 
villages in the area by the late 1970s.86 
By the late 1970s, it was taken for granted that the dam, the city, and its satel‑
lite villages constituted one whole as far as issues such as construction and the 
provision of welfare were concerned. The kishlak and city soviets became channels 
for directing the demands of villagers for roads, electrification, and housing. Offi‑
cials who worked for the Soviets were responsible for meeting with residents and 
party members to ascertain the needs of the different villages.87 They would then 
83. Protocol of the 5th Nurek City Party Conference, 27 January 1968, ACPT, f. 56, op. 7, 
d. 28, l. 4.
84.  Ibid., l. 32.
85. A. David´iants, V. Tarasevich, Svet Nureka [The Light of Nurek] (M. : Planeta, 1980).
86. This claim is based on my conversations with residents of New Tutkaul as well as neigh‑
boring villages like Kibil. See also the comments of Ia.M. Mirfozilov, chairman of the city 
soviet, at the IX Nurek City Party Conference, 18 November 1979, ACPT, f. 3, op. 303 d. 104, 
1978, l. 50.
87. “Rol´ mestnykh sovetov v razvitii Nureka [The Role of Local Councils in the Development 
of Nurek]” Norak, 13 June 1969, 2. The workings of the kishlak soviets were further explained 
to me by several officials who worked in them. Allowing for the fact that these individuals may 
have offered self‑serving accounts, what they say is consistent with the documentary record as 
well as the accounts of other residents I met with in the villages. 
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bring their demands to the city party and construction organizations and coordi‑
nate the implementation of different projects. As elsewhere in the Soviet Union, 
both formal and informal approaches were necessary to see a project through, and 
an effective chairman had to have good relations not just with the city party buro 
but the various construction and supply organizations in the city and on the dam.88 
Besides the usual demands for paved roads or running water, people also asked 
for clubhouses, which were constructed in almost all of the satellite villages in the 
1970s and 1980s. These clubs often doubled as mosques, with the full knowledge 
of the party organization.89 City authorities took responsibility for the cultural life 
of satellite villages, haranguing officials to meet the Soviet standards of cultural life 
as well as the demands of residents. In 1971, for example, the local paper reminded 
city authorities that 
the work of clubs, libraries, and the house of culture does not meet modern 
standards. Many residents complain about access to movies […] in the villages 
they barely show movies in the Tajik language.90 
Officials were chided at party meetings when they failed to follow through on the 
demands of village residents.91
Kishlak and city soviets were important for channeling the demands of resi‑
dents but also organizing them to carry out some of the beautification and infra‑
structural work on weekends. (Such mobilization, known throughout the Soviet 
Union as subotniki, or Saturdays, were often referred to informally and in offi‑
cial documents as “hashar,” harking back to older Central Asian traditions of 
communal labor.) Thus, while residents could use the institution of the kishlak 
and city soviets to demand housing materials, infrastructure, or schools, these 
88. The sheer volume of construction material available provided opportunities. Material that 
was used for a certain phase of production and then discarded, or proved unnecessary for one 
reason or another was sold off cheaply to workers, who could then use it to expand or rebuild 
their own houses.
89. Author’s interviews with former party officials. There is indeed ample, if somewhat 
indirect, proof of these processes. For example, in 1967 a new club was constructed on the 
outskirts of Nurek. Its initiators were a local representative in the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan 
and several communists in local party and municipal organs. The materials were provided by 
the city executive committee, presumably from the resources allocated for housing construc‑
tion, and the building itself was erected by volunteers. A library was organized, including 
4 500 titles, and quickly registered 256 readers. The club included a stage and audience hall, 
and hosted amateur theatre and musical performances, patriotic gatherings, and lectures on 
atheism. An article in Kommunist Tadzhikistana, entitled “A Club or a Prayer Hall?,” alleged 
that it was in fact being used for prayer. An inspection followed, and officials reported that 
there was no evidence that the club was being used for religious purposes. In reality, it almost 
certainly served a double function, with people of different ages using it in different ways. 
“Regarding the verification of an article…,” undated, but after April 1972, ACPT, f.  56, 
op. 11, d. 8, l. 43‑48.
90. “Vypolniat´ nakazi izberatelei [Carry out the mandate of electors],” Norak, 19 April 1971.
91. Ia.M. Mirfozilov, chairman of the city soviet, at the IX Nurek City Party, 18 November 1979, 
ACPT, f. 3, op. 303, d. 104, 1978, l. 50. 
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same institutions were used to organize them for labor along communal lines, 
helping overcome the deficiencies in labor of local construction organizations. 
The chairman of the city council singled out officials who had mobilized people 
to do this work: 
We should particularly note the initiative of those deputies of the city, kishlak 
and village Soviets who directed the public, and residents for the beautification 
of the city, villages, and kishlaks.92 
City organizations assumed, or tried to assume, increasing control over the terri‑
torial space of Nurek and its satellite villages. As the city’s commitment to the 
welfare of surrounding villages increased, so did the ambition of its reach into 
people’s lives. New schools were built, but pressure on families to send their 
children to those schools increased as well. Activists on the village soviet were 
expected to visit families individually and make sure their children, especially their 
daughters, were attending school, and to convince them to send their children for 
further education. In some cases, there was a kind of quid pro quo—officials would 
win the trust of village elders by helping them expand their house or build a new 
club/mosque, but they would then expect them to support girls going to school. 
Officials were even expected to use their position to intervene in cases where fami‑
lies were not providing proper support for their children’s studies.93 Similar strate‑
gies were used to convince families to let wives and daughters join the workforce, 
especially the textile plant. 
Medical care and hygiene were at the center of concerns about the rural popula‑
tion. Officials complained about the “lack of access to medical aid […] in the kish‑
laks medical propaganda is very weak, the work of the sanitary‑epidemiological 
station is not at its best, there is no control over the health conditions of the 
city and the villages.”94 Nurek’s hospital, finally completed in the early 1970s, 
became the center of a rural health network, with clinics and outposts in the satel‑
lite villages. As the capacity to provide for the rural population’s welfare grew, 
so did the boundaries of responsibilities in officials’ minds. Issues like domestic 
hygiene or the practice of delivering children at home and without professional 
assistance caused concern and were seen as evidence of dangerous traditionalism 
that city party officials had to combat.95 These concerns were sometimes brought 
up as part of articles or speeches about “internationalism,” reaffirming the link 
92. Ibid. This included planting 3 100 trees, clearing away 860 000 m2 of rocks and garbage, 
laying 2 km worth of water pipes, and the greening of Hafez street in New Tutkaul.
93. Author’s interview with Mirkolon Shodjonov, Dushanbe, July 2013. Shodjonov was the 
head of the Nurek hospital in the 1970s and 1980s. 
94. “Vypolniat´ nakazi izberatelei,” Norak, 19 April 1971. 
95. “Vyshe znamia internatsionalizma [Raise the banner of internationalism higher],” (Notes 
from the city party committee plenum.) Norak, 24 May 1974. 
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between welfare, social transformation, and commitment to equality between 
Soviet nationalities. 
Issues of health and the body were just one part of the broader transformation 
of life and attitudes that Nurek was supposed to oversee in the villages. By the end 
of the 1970s, officials boasted that with infrastructure and services now extending 
deeper into the villages, they were producing new Tajik men and women: 
The material and cultural level of the population has grown. Electricity and gas 
have become a part of everyday life, water supply has been improved, all of the 
kishlaks have midwife‑nursing stations, almost every family has a television, 
radio receiver, and each family gets three copies of newspapers and magazines. 
Soviet rituals, such as the day of the agricultural worker, Nowruz, and Komsomol 
weddings, had “firmly entered people’s consciousness.”96  However, officials were 
worried that they were still failing to bring women into “socially useful work,” and 
found that in one village “120 young women are neither studying nor working.” 
They found that the battle against the “antipodes of socialist way of life” was weak, 
and that “backward traditions, habits, views are still common among a certain part 
of the workers of the sovhoz [state farm].”97
Although Nurek and its satellite villages were supposed to form one whole, the 
imaginary boundary between them never disappeared. Certain events did bring 
the two sets of populations together—for example, each village hosting celebra‑
tions for one day during the Nowruz holiday, or weekly dances that attracted at 
least some young men from the villages. (The worksite itself, of course, was where 
“Europeans” and many “locals” interacted daily.) Nevertheless, the sense that the 
city was for “Russians” and the villages for Tajiks remained, as did complaints 
about inequality in the level of services in each. At a party conference in 1988, a 
teacher and party member complained “The social problem in our city is not being 
solved at the proper level, especially in the kishlaks…” Criticizing about the state 
of schools, telephone access, and the failure to protect the villages from mudslides, 
he noted “these questions have been raised numerous times at plenums of the City 
party committee and sessions of the city’s executive committee but have found 
no solution.”98
These shortcomings should not obscure the fact that the interactions of “locals,” 
managers, and party activists shows the way that ideals operated in practice. On 
the one hand, just as the typical problems of disease, boredom, and labor turnover 
96.  Nowruz is the Persian new year, marked at the Spring equinox. A pre‑Islamic holiday, it is 
celebrated widely throughout Central Asia. In the 1960s, some Tajik intellectuals campaigned 
for official recognition of the holiday, arguing that it was a “national” and not a “religious” 
holiday. Salimi Aiubzod, Tojikon dar Qarni Bistum [Tajiks in the Twentieth Century] (Praga: 
Post Skriptum Imprimatur, 2002), 212‑218.
97. “Regarding the work of the party organization of the Norak sovkhoz…,” 26 June 1979, 
ACPT, f. 3, op. 301, d. 103, l. 67‑68. 
98. XIII Nurek party conference, 29 October 1988, ACPT, f. 3, op. 360, d. 321, l. 43.
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convinced managers of the wisdom of investing in better facilities and housing 
for workers in Nurek, so did complaints from villagers lead those same officials 
to invest in infrastructure and facilities for the surrounding countryside. On the 
other hand, the way that these individuals approached both sets of problems reveals 
the powerful hold of utopian ideals of equality, internationalism, and urban and 
rural life. Utopian notions of the transformative power of a modern city and ideals 
of internationalism and equality pushed officials to promote local workers, and 
these ideals ultimately also pushed officials to extend the social welfare state to 
surrounding villages. 
Conclusion
Mass housing in the Khrushchev era and beyond created many neighborhoods 
and towns that looked indistinguishable from one another, as satirized in Eldar 
Riazanov’s film Ironiia sud´by [The Irony of Fate]. Nurek, too, was a city built 
from pre‑fabricated components—an assembly of available building designs, 
layouts, and materials. Yet in their assembly the city became something unique, 
precisely because of the myriad minor adjustments and negotiations between indi‑
viduals, party officials, and planners. Most of my interviewees—both those who 
lived in the city and those who were in the villages—insisted on the uniqueness of 
the project of which they had been a part and recognized its place in a larger Soviet 
story. While Nurek shares a great deal with other post‑war Soviet company towns, 
its residents are not wrong to think that it was nevertheless unique. Internationalism 
was a professed goal throughout the Soviet Union, but at sites like Nurek that ideal 
gained an additional importance as a way to prove Soviet commitment to anti‑co‑
lonialism. The ideal may not have been reached in reality, but the struggle over the 
definition and implementation of internationalism and equality nevertheless shaped 
the city and the satellite villages. 
I argued at the outset that understanding the history of the city requires looking 
beyond the dreams of planners and the goals of party leaders to see how these inter‑
acted with the engagement and resistance of workers and locals. It was not just 
the architectural shape of the city that emerged from these complex interactions, 
but the entire set of obligations between the state, the workers, and the villages 
surrounding Nurek—in other words, the local manifestation of the post‑war Soviet 
welfare state. Party institutions played two roles in this process. Party leaders like 
Pavel Gorbachev were often the most enthusiastic carriers of utopian visions for the 
new city. But they also played an important role, along with local institutions like 
the city and village soviets, in engaging with the demands of people. Party activ‑
ists and institutions served to channel demands and resistance, forcing officials to 
make endless minor and not so minor adjustments to the templates from which they 
were working. 
The story of Nurek also challenges a familiar dichotomy which sees ideology 
fading after the Khrushchev era. While it is true that utopian visions or internationalist 
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ideals were sometimes obscured by the everyday needs of construction, it is equally 
true that the commitment to these ideals, in terms both of physical resources and 
individual mobilization, only increased in the 1970s. It was in this period that 
resources became available to “bridge the gap between the city and the village” 
throughout the USSR, and the effects of this policy are dramatically visible in the 
relations between Nurek and its satellites. The ideological commitment of party 
activists, the mobilization of local residents, and the availability of resources 
all point to the fact that instead of stagnation, the period saw rapid movement 
and transformation. 
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